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Abstract
We develop an empirical framework that allows us to analyze the effects of heterogeneity across large 
shareholders, using a new blockholder-firm panel data set in which we can track all unique blockholders 
among large public U.S. firms.  We find statistically significant and economically important blockholder 
fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies.  This evidence suggests that 
blockholders vary in their beliefs, skills, or preferences.  Different large shareholders have distinct 
investment and governance styles: they differ in their approaches to corporate investment and growth, 
their appetite for financial leverage, and their attitudes towards CEO pay.  We also find blockholder fixed 
effects in firm performance measures, and differences in style are systematically related to firm 
performance differences.  Our results are consistent with influence for activist, pension fund, corporate, 
individual, and private equity blockholders, but consistent with systematic selection for mutual funds.  
Finally, we analyze sources of the heterogeneity, and find that blockholders with larger block size, board 
membership, or direct management involvement as officers are associated with larger effects on corporate 
policies and firm performance.   
JEL classification: G31; G32; G34; G35  
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1. Introduction
Do large shareholders play an important role for corporate policy choices and firm performance?  
At least since the seminal paper by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), a body of work in corporate finance has 
modeled the monitoring role of large shareholders as a potential solution to the agency problem that arises 
from the separation of ownership and control in public corporations.
1  Given this body of theoretical 
work, it is surprising that so few important corporate policies í related to, e.g., investment, financial, and 
executive compensation decisions í have been found empirically to be different in the presence of a large 
shareholder.
2
In this paper, we argue that one explanation for the lack of large-sample evidence of blockholder 
effects is that large shareholders differ from each other along important dimensions, and existing 
empirical frameworks do not incorporate blockholder heterogeneity into an economic analysis of large 
shareholders.  Blockholders can have heterogeneous beliefs, skills, and preferences.  For example, they 
can have different beliefs about how to best influence or select firms, and what set or combination of 
corporate policies will maximize firm value.  With few exceptions, such as the study of differences in 
large public pension funds’ shareholder proposals by Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), prior work has 
paid very little attention to the economic effects of blockholder heterogeneity.
3
Our contribution is to develop an empirical framework and to construct a new blockholder-firm 
panel data set that can be used to analyze the economic effects of blockholder heterogeneity.  The novel 
feature of our data set is that it allows us to identify and track all unique large shareholders among large 
1 Other theoretical papers have pointed out that factors such as liquidity or risk aversion may reduce blockholders’ 
incentives to monitor firms (e.g., Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994), Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), Kahn 
and Winton (1998), Maug (1998), and DeMarzo and Uroševiü (2006)).   
2 Examples of insignificant coefficients for an (outside) blockholder indicator variable include McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Mehran (1995) (Tobin’s Q and ROA), Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) (mergers and 
acquisitions), and Kaplan and Minton (2006) (CEO turnover).  By contrast, Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and 
Metrick (2006) relate large shareholders to Q, and report significant relations.  See Holderness (2003) for a survey 
of the blockholder literature, and Holderness (2006) for evidence that many U.S. public firms have a blockholder.  
3 Ample anecdotal evidence supports our idea of significant variation across large shareholders.  A blockholder can 
have very different beliefs, skills, and preferences compared to another blockholder, even if the comparison is within 
one category.  For example, the front page of a November 2004 issue of BusinessWeek features financier Eddie 
Lampert, a large shareholder in some companies through his firm ESL, and asks whether he is “The Next Warren 
Buffet?”  The article inside the magazine then discusses some similarities and some differences between the two 
blockholders’ investment and governance styles.   2
U.S. public firms í in essence the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1,500 universe í from 1996 to 2001.
4  This 
data set allows us to take the analysis of large shareholders to the smallest possible economic unit: the 
individual blockholder.  Our approach involves running panel regressions in which corporate policy and 
firm performance variables are regressed on year and firm fixed effects as well as time-varying firm-level 
characteristics to control for observable and unobservable firm heterogeneity, and most importantly, 
blockholder fixed effects.  Our framework is similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who study the impact 
of individual executives’ styles on firm policies.   
Consistent with a model in which large shareholders differ from each other along dimensions 
such as their beliefs, skills, or preferences, we find evidence of significant heterogeneity across different 
blockholders.  Investment, financial, and executive compensation policies are systematically related to the 
particular large shareholder present in a firm.  Adding blockholder fixed effects to a model that already 
controls for important firm variation improves the model fit, and our statistical tests reject the null 
hypothesis that all blockholder effects are zero for most policies.  The effects are mainly concentrated in 
blockholder categories such as activists, pension funds, corporations, individuals, private equity firms, 
and mutual funds.  By contrast, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no blockholder effects for 
categories such as insurance companies, money managers, and banks.   
To gauge the economic importance of the effects, we relate the interquartile range of an estimated 
blockholder fixed effects distribution to the average value of the corporate policy among the firms in our 
sample.  We conclude that the estimated effects are economically large.  For example, the interquartile 
range of the blockholder fixed effects investments distribution is 0.17, while the average investment ratio 
in our sample is 0.28.  Hence, a blockholder at the 75th percentile is associated with an investment ratio 
that is about 60% higher than for a blockholder at the 25th percentile, when compared to the mean.  We 
find similarly strong effects for the financial policies we study and for executive compensation.   
4 Throughout the paper, we use the terms “large shareholders” and “blockholders” interchangeably.  In either case, 
we refer to entities that own more than 5% of a firm’s outstanding shares, and thus have to be reported as “Principal 
Shareholders” in corporations’ proxy statements.  See Regulation and Schedule 14a (240.14a) of the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934 for further details.   3
Our investigation also shows that large shareholders have different investment and governance 
styles.  The fixed effects of individual shareholders across different corporate policies are correlated in an 
economically meaningful way.  Interestingly, we find that large shareholders differ in their approaches to 
corporate investment and growth, their appetites for financial leverage, and their attitudes towards CEO 
pay.  Some large shareholders have an aggressive investment style, and some have an aggressive financial 
style.  We also find that blockholders associated with higher CEO pay have a more aggressive attitude 
towards company growth.   
Given the evidence on blockholder heterogeneity and corporate policies, we ask whether firm 
performance is systematically related to the particular large shareholder present in a firm.  We find 
significant variation across different blockholders.  For example, a blockholder in the 75th (25th) 
percentile is associated with 4% (3%) higher (lower) return on assets (ROA), all else equal. These are 
large effects given that the average ROA is around 5% in our sample.  We also find that some blockholder 
investment and governance styles are linked to higher operating performance and Tobin’s Q.   Firms with 
large shareholders that have a more aggressive investment or financial style, or who are associated with 
more CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, are associated with higher ROA and Q ratios.   
The documented blockholder effects on firm policies could be consistent with either an influence 
explanation, in the sense that large shareholders impact policies, or a selection interpretation, in that 
blockholders systematically select firms in which they invest major stakes based on a preference for 
certain policies.  Our evidence is more consistent with an influence explanation for activist, pension fund, 
corporate, individual, and private equity blockholders, but more consistent with a systematic selection 
explanation for large mutual fund shareholders.  In a final step, we explore some potential sources of the 
blockholder effects by relating the magnitude of the fixed effects to three observable blockholder 
characteristics.  We find that blockholders with more potential power, measured by block size, board 
representation and direct management involvement as an officer of the corporation, are associated with 
larger effects on corporate policies and firm performance.   4
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops an empirical framework for analyzing 
blockholder heterogeneity.  Section 3 describes our new blockholder-firm panel data set.  Section 4 
reports evidence on the statistical significance of blockholder fixed effects in corporate policies.  Section 
5 analyzes the economic significance of the estimated effects.  Section 6 explores the origin and sources 
of the estimated blockholder effects.  Section 7 concludes.   
2. An empirical framework for analyzing blockholder heterogeneity   
Consider a model of the world in which large shareholders differ from each other along 
dimensions such as their beliefs, skills, or preferences.  For example, different blockholders may have 
heterogeneous beliefs about how to monitor firms most effectively or what constitutes “good policies” 
that maximize firm value.  In this section, we develop an empirical framework that can be used to analyze 
the economic effects of such heterogeneity across large shareholders.
5
2.1. Identification of blockholder fixed effects   
Before we describe our empirical framework in more detail, we can explain our identification 
strategy for estimating blockholder fixed effects in firm policies using a simple and intuitive example.  
Consider for example a firm’s choice of capital structure policy.  In the first step, we compute the residual 
for each firm-year based on a benchmark model specification that controls for year and firm fixed effects 
as well as time-varying firm-level characteristics which previous literature has suggested as factors 
affecting a firm’s capital structure decision.  Next, we quantify the extent to which the variation in these 
residuals can be explained by blockholder fixed effects.
6
5 Several previous studies (e.g., Barclay and Holderness (1991)) have shown that the trading of large blocks is 
associated with abnormal positive stock returns.  These papers analyze the average stock market reaction to large 
block trades.  However, the stock market reaction might vary across block trades depending on who the blockholder 
is.  To the extent that the stock market incorporates information about the changes to corporate policies that a 
blockholder will bring about, the results of these papers suggest that blockholder heterogeneity is important.   
6 The panel regression model we use is similar to that of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who study the impact on firm 
behavior of individual executives’ styles.  They identify manager fixed effects from variations in firms’ policies 
created by executives who move from one firm to another, and presumably imprint similar styles on the different 5
Formally, we estimate the following panel regression model for each policy variable of interest:   
it t i it it it y OG H     ȕX īZ , (1) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes years.   it y  is one of the firm policy variables of interest,  t O  are year 
fixed effects,  i G  are firm fixed effects,  it X  is a vector of time-varying firm-level controls,   it Z  is a  1 J u
vector of blockholder indicators, and  it H  is an error term.  The year dummy variables control for 
aggregate fluctuations in corporate policies over time. This model specification also controls for fixed 
differences between firms (and therefore industry effects).  ī  is the focus of our study and is a 1 J u
vector of blockholder fixed effects, where J is the total number of different large shareholders in our data 
set.  Note that in equation (1), the identification of the fixed effect for blockholder j comes from both the 
cross-section of j’s stakes in different firms in a given year and from the time-series of its holdings.   
As can be seen in equation (1), it is not feasible for us to estimate the fixed effect for a large 
shareholder that is present in only one firm during the entire time period in which the firm is in our 
dataset.  The effect of such a blockholder is perfectly collinear with the firm fixed effect, thus we cannot 
statistically separate out their respective effects.  It is feasible for us to identify the blockholder fixed 
effect for a large shareholder that is present in a firm during some subperiod of the entire time period 
which the firm is in our dataset.  However, the fixed effects for such large shareholders may simply proxy 
for some firm-period-specific effects. It is difficult for us to rule out that we are incorrectly attributing 
firm-period-specific effects to a blockholder instead of some unobservable time-varying firm-level 
characteristic.  In estimating equation (1), we therefore err on the side of caution by imposing the 
restriction that a blockholder has to be present in multiple firms.
7
firms that they manage.  The identification in this paper comes from blockholders who move from one firm to 
another, but also from the cross-section of holdings because, unlike managers, large shareholders are often present in 
multiple firms at a given point in time.   
7 We consider it unlikely that this restriction biases our results in the direction of stronger evidence.  Blockholders 
with stakes in only one firm are likely to be management, company founders and their families, and Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans, i.e., blockholders that we expect to have a strong impact on firms’ policies.  As a robustness 
check, we have estimated specification (1) including blockholder fixed effects for large shareholders that are present 6
2.2. Influence versus selection   
Significant blockholder fixed effects in corporate policies can be consistent with either of two 
interpretations.  On the one hand, they can be due to influence on firm decisions by different large 
shareholders, i.e. causality goes from an investment by a large shareholder to changes in policies.  This 
interpretation suggests that a large shareholder influences policies in the same way across all its 
investments because of a belief that a particular set of policies maximizes firm value.  On the other hand, 
the blockholder fixed effects could also be evidence that different blockholders systematically select firms 
based on different corporate policies, i.e., causality goes from changes in firm policies to an investment 
by a large shareholder.   
2.2.1. How can blockholders influence firm policies?   
In the U.S., large shareholders can influence firms directly through electing directors, voting on 
changes to the corporate structure or charter, or through proxy contests and shareholder proposals.
8  They 
can also impact policies indirectly through informal negotiations and governance discussions with 
incumbent management.  We are not aware of any detailed clinical study of large shareholders in the 
U.S., but a recent paper by Becht et al. (2006) carefully examines the investment and governance style of 
the Hermes Focus Fund, a shareholder engagement fund in the U.K.  Becht, et al. show that a lot of 
influence appears to be informal.  Brav et al. (2006) perform a detailed study of one type of shareholder, 
hedge funds, and provide several specific examples, using SC 13D filings, of how such institutions 
actively influence corporate policies.
9
in a firm during some subperiod of the entire time period in which the firm is in our dataset.  The results tend to be 
stronger and statistically more significant than those reported in the paper.   
8 Because shareholder proposals cannot relate to the day-to-day operation of firms, some legal scholars have argued 
that there are significant restrictions on the ability of large shareholders to directly influence a firm (e.g., Black 
(1990)).   
9 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, rules 13D-1 to 13D-6 (§240.13d), contain the legal definitions and filing 
requirements for large shareholders.  Individuals and groups that have acquired a beneficial stake of 5% or more are 
required to file form SC 13D.  However, a select category of “persons” such as banks, brokers and dealers, and 7
Item 4 of form SC 13D requires the filer to disclose intentions with respect to the company, and 
thus offers researchers some insights into the way large shareholders could potentially influence 
companies.  As can be seen in Appendix I, item 4 of form SC 13D is very specific and lists ten different 
actions of a large shareholder that would require disclosure, many of which are operational in nature and 
thus directly related to the corporate policies that we study in this paper (e.g., M&A activity, capital 
structure and dividend policy).  While a firm is not required to follow the requests of a large shareholder, 
managers who do not comply with the suggestions of a blockholder may lose their jobs.  The following 
example from our sample illustrates the significant power that a large shareholder can exert if a firm does 
not follow its suggestions.   
2.2.2. Example of influence activities: ESL’s investment in Autozone, Inc.   
Eddie Lampert’s ESL Partners acquired a stake in Autozone, Inc. on June 4, 1999.  In form SC 
13D, item 4 of the initial filing, ESL stated that the block of 11.7% was acquired in the ordinary course of 
business solely for investment purposes and not for the purposes of participating in, or influencing, the 
management of Autozone.  However, on July 12, 1999, ESL increased their stake to 13% and added to the 
disclosure in item 4 that “from time to time, ESL […] may discuss Autozone and its performance with 
representatives of Autozone […].”
On August 13, 1999, ESL decided to increase its stake to 14.5% and filed under SC 13D, item 4 
that “The Filing Persons believe that the recent operating performance of Autozone does not properly 
reflect the strength of its franchise […]. The Filing Persons have also […] indicated their willingness, if 
asked, to make representatives of the Filing Persons available to serve as members of the Board of 
Directors.”
insurance companies can file, under certain restrictions, an abbreviated form, called SC 13G. Several persons in our 
sample who are commonly associated with an active investment role do sometimes file form SC 13G and not the 
form SC 13D.  For example, Warren Buffett filed form SC 13G after his acquisition of a 5.5% stake in American 
Express.  The reason was that Mr. Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway held the block jointly with some of the insurance 
subsidiaries of Berkshire Hathaway (National Indemnity Company, National Fire & Marine Insurance Company).   8
In August of 1999, ESL and its partners increased the pressure further and notified Autozone and 
federal antitrust authorities that they each had the intention to acquire more than 15% of the shares.  
These notifications were considered a pre-merger notification as required under the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.  This was a direct threat to the management of Autozone, and, as is 
evident from the amendment to the SC 13D filed on September 17, 1999, Autozone’s management gave 
in to the demands of ESL: “[A]t a Board of Directors meeting held on September 17, 1999, the Board of 
Directors voted to expand the Board from nine members to ten and nominated Edward S. Lampert for 
election to the Board of Directors. Through Mr. Lampert's representation on the Board, the Filing 
Persons anticipate that they will continue to have discussions and other communications with Autozone’s 
management […].”
2.2.3. Systematic selection of large ownership stakes   
Under the selection hypothesis, large shareholders still have heterogeneous beliefs about what 
constitutes “good policies” and they systematically base their investment decisions on these beliefs.  
However, rather than actively influencing corporate policies by informal negotiations and governance 
discussions with incumbent management, they select firms such that if policies do change, they sell their 
large stake and invest in another firm that has already adopted the policies that the blockholder prefers.  
For example, a conservative mutual fund may, as an internal investment rule, only invest in firms that pay 
out at least 50% of free cash flow as dividends.  If the payout ratio of one of their investments dropped 
below that threshold, they would sell their stake and seek out a different firm from the investment 
opportunity set that had a payout ratio more in line with their belief about value maximization.   
2.2.4. Empirical implications
The influence and selection hypotheses come with different predictions regarding the precise 
timing of changes in firm policies.  Under the influence interpretation, firm policy changes take place 
after the investment by a blockholder.  By contrast, under the selection hypothesis, firm policy changes 9
start to take place, and then blockholders invest in response to these policy changes.  Our identification 
strategy is therefore to use these predictions regarding timing of policy changes to provide evidence on 
whether blockholder fixed effects in firm policies are more consistent with active influence or selection.
Finally, it is important to note that there is no reason for us a priori to believe that one of these 
two explanations fits all large shareholders: Some large shareholders may be able to influence firms, 
while others systematically select firms based on the observable corporate policies which they believe 
maximize firm value.  In fact, the argument in this paper that heterogeneity across large shareholders is 
important suggests that variation in, e.g., skills or sophistication, can explain why some blockholders are 
more likely to influence versus select the firms in which they hold large ownership stakes.   
2.3. A comparison of empirical frameworks   
  Because we argue that accounting for blockholder heterogeneity might be important for an 
analysis of the economic effects of large shareholders, it is useful to compare the empirical framework we 
developed in the section 2.1 to standard frameworks which do not account for variation in behavior across 
blockholders.  First, consider the following model:   
it t i it it it yd OG J H     ȕX , (2) 
where it d  is a dummy variable indicating that there is at least one large shareholder present in firm i in 
year t.  Compared to equation (1), this model specification imposes the restriction that the effects of all J
blockholders are identical and equal to J .  That is, equation (2) assumes that all large shareholders have a 
homogeneous investment and governance style.  Thus, equation (2) only allows us to estimate an average 
blockholder effect.   
  Second, we can also consider the following model:   
it t i it it it y OG H     ȕX ȖD , (3) 10
where it D  is a  1 u K  vector of blockholder category indicator variables.  These different categories could 
be activists, corporations, mutual funds, and so on.  Ȗ  is a  K u 1  vector of blockholder category fixed 
effects.  Compared to equation (2), this model specification relaxes the restriction that the effect of any 
blockholder j is equal to J .
10  However, it imposes the restriction that the effect related to any 
blockholder  k J j is identical to  k J , where  k J  is the set of blockholders of type k.  Thus, in equation 
(3), all large shareholders in a particular category are restricted to have the same effect.   
In our empirical analysis in Section 4, we will compare the effects of using model specification 
(2) or (3) to using specification (1), which takes an analysis of large shareholders to the smallest possible 
economic unit and accounts for heterogeneity across blockholders.   
3. Data
3.1. Construction of new blockholder-firm panel data set  
To analyze the effects of blockholder heterogeneity, we require a panel data set that allows us to 
identify and track each unique blockholder, both over time in a given firm and also across firms at any 
given point in time.  Because such a data set cannot be obtained from standard databases, we construct a 
new blockholder-firm panel data set.  We start with the 1996-2001 unbalanced panel data set of 1,919 
different large public corporations in the U.S. and all their blockholders, originally compiled by Dlugosz 
et al. (2006).
11  This set of firms is essentially the S&P 1,500 universe excluding dual-class share firms.  
Their data on blockholders are hand-collected from firms’ annual proxy statements.
12  As is common in 
the study of investment and financial policies, we exclude financial firms and utilities from our analysis.   
  The next step involves identifying and tracking all unique blockholders that are present in at least 
two different firms.  The Dlugosz, et al. database contains information on the names of all 5% 
10 Qiu (2006) presents evidence that public pension funds and mutual funds are associated with different behavior.   
11 The Dlugosz, et al. (2006) database is free from biases due to coding and classification errors compared to 
standard databases such as Compact Disclosure.   
12 The use of annual data, as opposed to more frequent observations, may underestimate the number of large 
shareholders because some blockholders hold just below 5% to avoid reporting responsibilities, and some may enter 
and exit our panel within a year, thus not showing up in annual proxy statements.   11
blockholders copied from firms’ original proxy statements, available through the Edgar online database.  
However, in many cases the naming of blockholders is not consistent across years or firms.  For example, 
mutual fund manager Fidelity shows up under different names, including “FIDELITY MANAGEMENT 
& RESEARCH CORP,” “FMR CORP,” “FIDELITY INVESTMENTS,” and “SUBSIDIARIES OF FMR 
CORP.”  Some involve misspellings in the original SEC filings, like “FIEDELITY MANAGEMENT & 
RESEARCH CORP” or “FIDELTY MANAGEMENT & RESEARCH.”   
The most complicated cases arise because various investment vehicles are sometimes used by the 
same blockholder.  The names of those entities may not necessarily resemble the name of the blockholder.  
For example, “BASS MANAGEMENT TRUST,” “BASS; ROBERT ET AL.” and “SID R BASS & LEE 
M BASS GROUP,” are easily recognized as investment vehicles associated with the so-called “Bass 
brothers” (Lee, Ed, Sid, and Robert Bass), the Texas financiers.  However, several other entities also 
belong to the same blockholder, e.g., “KEYSTONE INC,” and limited partnerships, such as “FW 
STRATEGIC PARTNERS L P,” and “TRINITY I FUND L P.”  We use several different information 
sources (e.g., information in firms’ SEC filings and newspaper databases) to identify the ultimate owner 
of such entries.
Although we have been careful in assigning unique identifiers to all the blockholders in our 
dataset, for instance by correcting misspellings and identifying various investment vehicles used by the 
same investor, our blockholder-firm panel data set is still subject to at least three limitations.  First, the 
role of blockholders may well be different in our sample of larger, established firms than in smaller, 
entrepreneurial firms.  For example, one could argue that the scope for influence is smaller among our 
large firms.  Second, we aggregate holdings by different subsidiaries into one block.  This is appropriate 
when subsidiaries share a common investment or governance function.  However, if there is significant 
heterogeneity across different subsidiaries, then this approach will only be able to capture the component 
of the effect that is shared across all subsidiaries.  Third, we determine ownership based on who is the 
largest ultimate owner of a particular entity even if there are other owners as well.  This approach is 12
similar to the one used to identify ultimate owners in stock pyramids and other complex ownership 
structures (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999)).   
3.2. Summary statistics of large shareholders
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the 361 unique large shareholders in our data set.  We 
classify blockholders into the following categories: (i) activists and pension funds, (ii) corporations, (iii) 
individuals, (iv) mutual funds, (v) insurance companies and money managers, (vi) hedge funds,
13 (vii) 
leverage buyout (LBO) firms, (viii) venture capital (VC) firms, and (ix) banks, trusts, and universities.  In 
some of these categories, we include multiple subcategories of blockholders, e.g., activists as well as 
pension funds, to avoid categories with very few observations.  We see that the average large shareholder 
is present in 16 different firms, and the average blockholder fixed effect is estimated from 32 (= 11,625 / 
361) blockholder-years.   
There are 23 large activist and pension fund shareholders.  Activists are shareholders who 
announce their intention of influencing firm policies at the time of the block purchase or who are known 
to have pursued activist policies in the past.  We have checked that our activist classifications correspond 
to those of previous work specifically studying shareholder activists (Holderness and Sheehan (1985), 
Smith (1996), and Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998)).  This group includes several well-known raiders, 
like Carl Icahn, Warren Buffet, and the Bass brothers.  Pension funds include U.S. and international 
public pension funds (e.g., the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System and the Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan), and some large private pension funds.   
Table 1 also shows that there are 29 blockholding corporations in our data set.  For example, Intel 
Corporation or Henkel KgAA, a German manufacturer of personal care and household cleaning products, 
hold multiple blocks in our dataset.  Previous research suggests that these corporate blockholdings may be 
related to strategic product market relationships (Allen and Phillips (2000) and Fee, Hadlock and Thomas 
13 Note that our sample period predates the more recent time period in which hedge funds have become more active 
investors (e.g., Klein and Zur (2006) and Brav et al. (2006)).   13
(2006)).  In addition, some individuals are also large shareholders in our data set.  Most of them are non-
management blockholders in at least one of their holdings.  An example is Wayne Huizenga.   
Finally, we see that various financial institutions are present as blockholders in a large number of 
different firms.  One hundred and eleven mutual funds such as Fidelity are present as blockholders, and 
119 insurance companies and money managers are large shareholders.  A relatively small number of 
hedge funds, LBO firms,
14 and VC firms (e.g., Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers), are also present as 
large shareholders.  In addition, there are 26 bank, trust, and university blockholders.   
3.3. Data on corporate policies and firm performance   
We analyze a broad range of important corporate policy variables.  The specific investment 
variables we study are investment policy, investment to Q and cashflow sensitivities, mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) and diversification policies, and research and development (R&D) policy.  The 
financial variables we analyze are leverage, dividend policy, and cash holdings.  Our source for data on 
annual accounting variables is Compustat.  We winsorize the variables at the 1% level in each tail.  From 
SDC’s M&A database (by Thomson Financial), we obtain data on the number of acquisitions and 
diversifying acquisitions.
15  The specific executive compensation variables we analyze are base salary, 
total annual compensation, including stock and stock option grants, and total dollar equity incentives, 
which is the pay-for-performance measure used by, e.g., Core and Guay (1999).  Our source for data on 
CEO pay is S&P’s Execucomp database.  All variable definitions are reported in Appendix II.   
Table 2 presents means, medians, and standard deviations for the corporate variables that we 
analyze.  The first set of columns presents summary statistics for our new blockholder-firm data set.  As a 
comparison, the second set of columns in the table reports the same statistics but for the full Compustat 
data set during the time period we study.  The firms in our data set tend to be larger and more profitable, 
14 To increase their influence, some LBO firms will take firms private.  This introduces a sample selection bias since 
we only analyze public corporations.  However, such a bias is likely to work against us finding any effects on 
corporate policies for this category of large shareholders.   
15 Given the short time period available for our analysis, and given the infrequency of major corporate divestitures 
(e.g., spinoffs, equity carve-outs, and selloffs), we do not study such corporate events.  14
have higher cash flows, dividend/earnings ratios, and leverage than the average Compustat firm. Our 
sample of firms also invests less in capital expenditures and R&D, as we would expect from S&P 1,500 
firms.   
4. Statistical evidence on blockholder heterogeneity and corporate policies
In this section, we demonstrate the importance of accounting for heterogeneity across blockholder 
by documenting statistically significant blockholder fixed effects in corporate policies.    
4.1. Large shareholders and corporate policies: Average blockholder effects
Before applying our new empirical framework for analyzing blockholder heterogeneity developed 
in Section 2.1, we report in Table 3 evidence of average blockholder effects by estimating specifications 
(2) and (3) above, which do not account for blockholder heterogeneity.  In the table, we report results for 
three corporate policies í investment, leverage, and total CEO pay í but we note that the conclusion is 
the same for the other policies.  The first set of columns reports results from regressing a policy variable 
on year and firm fixed effects, time-varying firm-level controls and a blockholder indicator variable 
(equation (2)).
16  We see that the blockholder dummy is not significantly related to any of the policies.
The second set of columns in the table reports evidence from including a set of blockholder category 
indicator variables (equation (3)).  We find that only two blockholder categories are significant at the 10% 
level and for only one policy variable (leverage).   
There are two possible interpretations of the results in Table 3.  First, it is possible that there is no 
systematic relation between the presence of a blockholder in large U.S. firms and the policies of these 
firms.  Second, it is also possible that heterogeneity across large shareholders is important, but if the 
16 One concern is that blockholdings change only slowly from year to year, and in a specification with firm fixed 
effects, it might be problematic to identify effects of blockholders or blockholder categories, even if they are present 
in the data (see the arguments by Zhou (2001) regarding the evidence by Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999)).  
However, we have checked that the conclusion is unaffected if we use industry fixed effects instead of firm fixed 
effects.15
effects are averaged across blockholders or within blockholder categories, as they are when we estimate 
specifications (2) and (3), opposing effects cancel each other out.  
4.2. Blockholder fixed effects in corporate policies   
Table 4 reports regression results using the framework outlined in equation (1).  It shows two 
panel regressions for each corporate policy variable.  The first row reports the adjusted R
2 and the number 
of firm-years for a benchmark model specification which includes year and firm fixed effects and time-
varying firm-level characteristics only.  The second row adds blockholder fixed effects, and reports the 
number of blockholders, the median effect, and an F-test for the joint significance of the blockholder 
fixed effects.
17 Adding blockholder fixed effects improves the model fit of almost all of the regressions 
despite having already controlled for important observable and unobservable heterogeneity across firms 
through time-varying controls and firm fixed effects.  Also, for most of the policies, the F-statistics are 
statistically significant, rejecting the null hypothesis that all blockholder fixed effects are zero.   
The first variable we analyze in Panel A, investment, is defined as capital expenditures divided by 
lagged net property, plant, and equipment.  The benchmark regression includes as explanatory variables 
year and firm fixed effects, lagged Q, lagged cash flow, and the lagged logarithm of total assets.  We find 
that the model fit increases by two percentage points when we add blockholder fixed effects.  Also, the F-
statistic is large and significant (p-value = 0.000), rejecting the hypothesis that all blockholder fixed 
effects are zero for firms’ capital expenditures decisions.  
Next, we evaluate investment to Q and cash flow sensitivities.  The benchmark regression for 
investment to Q (cash flow) sensitivity involves regressing investment on year and firm fixed effects, 
lagged cash flow, lagged Q, lagged logarithm of total assets, and firm fixed effects interacted with lagged 
Q (cash flow).  We then add blockholder fixed effects as well as those effects interacted with lagged Q 
(cash flow).  The estimated coefficients of interest are those on the interaction terms.  We find once again 
17 The number of firm-years and blockholder fixed effects differ across policies due to missing observations.   16
substantial increases in adjusted R
2 – as much as seven percentage points.  Also, the F-statistics show that 
there are significant blockholder fixed effects in both measures of firms’ investment sensitivity.   
Other important dimensions of a firm’s investment decision are its acquisition, diversification, 
and R&D policy.  Each regression contains year and firm fixed effects, lagged cash flow, lagged 
logarithm of total assets, and return on assets.  We cannot reject the hypothesis of no blockholder fixed 
effects in firms’ M&A activity or diversification policy.  However, for R&D policy, we find that the 
model fit improves by about two percentage points and the F-statistic is significant when we add 
blockholder fixed effects.   
In Panel B, we turn to financial policies.  The benchmark regression includes year and firm fixed 
effects, lagged cash flow, lagged logarithm of total assets, and return on assets.  Although the model fit of 
the benchmark regressions for cash holdings, dividend policy, and leverage are already high (in the range 
of 66-85%), we find that it increases by up to two percentage points as we allow financial policies to be 
blockholder specific.  Also, the F-statistics are large and significant (p-values = 0.000), rejecting the 
hypothesis that all blockholder fixed effects are zero for firms’ decisions regarding financial policies.
18
Finally, in Panel C we turn to executive compensation.  Each regression contains year and firm 
fixed effects, lagged logarithm of total assets, and lagged Q.  We analyze three different variables: CEO 
salary, total incentive CEO compensation, and total CEO compensation which includes stock and options 
grants.  We find substantial increases in adjusted R
2 of as much as nine percentage points.  Also, from the 
F-statistics, we reject the hypothesis of no blockholder fixed effects in any of the policy variables related 
to CEO pay.   
In summary, the evidence in Table 4 establishes statistically significant blockholder fixed effects 
in a broad range of important corporate policies.  Note in Table 4 that the median effect associated with a 
large shareholder is not significantly different from zero for any of the policies, which is consistent with 
the insignificant average blockholder effects in Table 3.  However, our evidence shows that an average or 
18 The significant blockholder fixed effects in dividend policy might possibly be explained by different large 
shareholders having differential tax status (see, e.g., Pérez-González (2003)), although this is an unlikely 
explanation for blockholder fixed effects in many of the other corporate policy variables.   17
median blockholder effect of zero does not mean that large shareholders are not important.  It is the 
heterogeneity across blockholders that leads to a dispersion of the fixed effects that is statistically, and, as 
we will show in section 5, economically important.  Finally, we note that we have to be careful not to give 
any causal interpretations of the blockholder fixed effects in the table.
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4.3. Blockholder fixed effects for different categories of large shareholders
Next, we examine whether these blockholder fixed effects in corporate policies are present for all 
blockholder categories or whether they are concentrated in some of them.  Table 5 reports separate F-tests 
for the joint significance of the blockholder fixed effects for each group of large shareholders. In the case 
of activists and pension funds, we find significant effects for almost all of the policies.  We document 
significant effects for R&D, financial policies such as dividends, and CEO compensation for corporate 
blockholders.  We also find significant blockholder fixed effects in investment and financial policies for 
mutual funds.  For LBO firms, we find significant effects related to capital expenditures, leverage ratios, 
and, cash holdings; by contrast, the significant effects are related to investment, R&D policy, and cash 
holdings for VC firms.  Interestingly, for many corporate policies, the F-tests cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of zero blockholder fixed effects for insurance companies and money managers, despite the 
wealth of observations in this category.  Moreover, none of the F-tests for banks, trusts, and universities 
are significantly different from zero.
20
19 We have performed a series of regressions to check that the results presented above are robust.  First, while we 
report results using the variable definitions and benchmark model specifications in Bertrand and Schoar (2003), we 
have also checked that these particular choices are robust to the use of some alternatives.  Our results are robust to 
scaling capital expenditures by lagged total book value of assets, scaling R&D expenditures with lagged sales, using 
market-based leverage ratios, or scaling cash holdings by lagged book value of assets net of cash holdings.  Second, 
we have added controls for asset uniqueness and tax advantage of debt in the leverage regressions, but the results 
were similar.  Third, our results are robust to adding an indicator variable to the benchmark regression that is one if 
there is a management blockholder present in the firm.  Finally, we check whether large shareholders with a very 
large number of investments, such as Fidelity, drive our results by excluding all blockholders in the upper quartile of 
the distribution of the number of ownership stakes; again the results were unaffected.   
20 One explanation for this evidence is suggested by Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988), who study how business ties 
affect proxy voting by analyzing institutional investors’ aggregate votes on management-initiated proposals for anti-
takeover provisions.  They find that banks and trusts, which frequently derive benefits from lines of business under 
management control, are less likely to be active in opposing management.  See also Davis and Kim (2006).   18
The conclusion from this investigation is that significant blockholder effects are present for 
activists, pension funds, individuals, corporations, mutual funds, and private equity firms.  These results 
suggest that there is significant variation in beliefs, skills, and preferences also among blockholders 
within the same category of large shareholders.  At the same time, the lack of significant blockholder 
effects, after controlling for firm-level heterogeneity, for many large shareholders of other types (e.g., 
money managers and banks) should caution us from attributing a significant monitoring role to these 
particular categories of blockholders.   
4.4. Discussion of limitations of empirical framework
While our framework is a first attempt in the corporate finance literature to incorporate 
blockholder heterogeneity in a large-sample study of blockholders and corporate policies, we recognize 
that it has some limitations.  First, equation (1) restricts the effect of blockholder j to be time-invariant, 
identical across the blockholder’s holdings, and equal to  j J .  However, some factors such as 
blockholders’ preferences can be expected to be relatively fixed.  In a clinical study of CalPERS, Jacoby 
(2007) finds that the fund had a pervasive governance style for years, despite top-management turnover, 
and even applied it to overseas holdings in markets with different governance systems and cultures.  
Some large shareholders, e.g., mutual funds, have governance departments to ensure consistent proxy 
voting.  At Fidelity votes are cast by the Investment & Advisor Compliance Department in accordance 
with the “Fidelity Funds’ Proxy Voting Guidelines.”  Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) sells the 
“Governance Analytics” software, which helps funds vote consistently.  While we study corporate 
policies, and not proxy voting, we believe that it is conceivable that coordination also takes place prior to 
the communication about policies between a large shareholder and the management of a firm.   
The short time period of our panel limits our ability to compare blockholder fixed effects over 
different sub-periods.  However, as a crude test, we have estimated blockholder fixed effects separately 
for 1996-1998 and 1999-2001.  We find that the blockholder effects for the early and late periods are 19
positively correlated for all corporate policies; 11 of 13 correlations are statistically significant at least at 
the 10% level (unreported).  This evidence suggests that there is consistency in the time-series, at least 
over a short period, in a blockholder’s approach to corporate policies.  A related issue is that all firm-year 
observations of a blockholder are equally-weighted.  For example, we are assigning equal weight to a 
block of 25% and a block of 5%.  In Section 6, we provide some insight on this issue by examining 
whether the average block size is systematically related to the magnitude of the estimated blockholder 
effects.
When two or more large shareholders are present in a firm at the same time, equation (1) 
estimates their separate effects without accounting for interaction effects between the blockholders.  A 
related issue is that the presence of multiple large shareholders might lead to an underestimation of 
blockholder effects.  We gauge the severity of this problem by calculating the “average block overlap” for 
each blockholder in the following way.  For each firm-year in which a blockholder is present, we create 
indicator variables for all other shareholders that hold a block.  We sum these variables over all firm-years 
in which the blockholder is present, take an average, and divide by the number of firm-years.  The overall 
average blockholder overlap is less than 20%.  We conclude from this exercise that while the problem of 
blockholder overlap may bias the estimated fixed effects downward in our sample, the effect does not 
appear to be severe.
Finally, the firm fixed effects specification that we choose to account for unobservable firm 
characteristics represents a parametric approach to handling correlation in the errors. Petersen (2007) 
demonstrates that OLS standard errors are unbiased after the inclusion of firm fixed effects if these effects 
are not time-varying.  When firm fixed effects decay over time, a cluster-correction is desirable. To 
address this issue, we have performed simulations following Petersen’s methodology. The (unreported) 
results indicate that cluster-correction in firm-fixed effect regressions is ineffective with a short time-
series such as ours.  We have therefore evaluated an alternative approach that requires less 
parameterization by estimating OLS regressions without firm fixed effects, but with clustered standard 
errors. Simulations show this method produces unbiased standard errors even for a short panel such as 20
ours.  In unreported regressions, we have re-estimated the results in Table 4 and find that the significance 
of the blockholder fixed effects increases.  Since blockholder fixed effects under this alternative 
specification may be absorbing unobservable firm characteristics, we choose to report the firm fixed 
effects specification results.   
5. Economic significance of blockholder heterogeneity   
Most of the analysis so far has involved documenting statistically significant blockholder 
heterogeneity in corporate policies.  In this section, we turn to an analysis of the magnitude and economic 
significance of the estimated blockholder effects.   
5.1. Magnitude of blockholder fixed effects   
In Table 6, we quantify the economic significance of the estimated blockholder effects by 
examining how large the estimated differences between large shareholders actually are.  That is, how big 
are the differences between different blockholders in economic terms?  One approach to answer this 
question is to compare the policy effect associated with a blockholder in the lower tail of a blockholder 
fixed effects distribution to one in the upper tail of the same distribution.  The first set of columns in 
Panel A of the table reports the 25th and 75th percentiles for each of the blockholder fixed effects 
distributions.
21  Overall, we find that the magnitude of the blockholder effects is economically significant.   
For investment, we find that the difference between large shareholders in the bottom and top 
quartiles of the investment distribution is 0.17.  This can be usefully compared to an average ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets of 0.28 among the firms in our sample.  We also see in the table that a 
blockholder at the 25th percentile is associated with 0.29 fewer acquisitions compared to one at the 75th 
percentile.  Given that we observe on average about 0.59 acquisitions per year in our sample, this 
difference appears to be economically large, although the F-test for acquisition policy was not statistically 
21 In an attempt to account for measurement error in the blockholder fixed effects, we compute these statistics by 
weighting each blockholder fixed effect by the inverse of its standard error.   21
significant in Table 4.  We also find that the difference between large shareholders in the bottom and top 
quartiles of the R&D distribution is 0.02, compared to an average R&D ratio of 0.03 in the overall 
sample.   
Turning to financial policies, firms in our sample have an average leverage ratio of about 0.37. A 
blockholder in the lower tail is associated with 0.06 lower leverage, all else equal.  That is, a blockholder 
at the 25th percentile is associated with about 16% less debt in the capital structure.  We also see in the 
table that a blockholder at the 25th percentile is associated with a 0.09 lower dividends to earnings ratio 
compared to one at the 75th percentile.  Given that the average dividend/earnings ratio is about 0.19 in 
our sample, this difference seems economically significant.  We also find that the difference between 
large shareholders in the bottom and top quartiles of the cash holdings distribution is 0.58, compared to an 
average cash ratio of 1.23 in the overall data set.   
Finally, we turn to executive compensation and find that the magnitudes of the estimated 
blockholder fixed effects are economically large.  The results are most easily interpreted in dollar terms.  
To highlight just one example, a blockholder in the lower tail of the total CEO pay distribution is 
associated with $1.4 million lower total executive compensation per year compared to the sample average 
of $5.4 million, while one in the upper tail is associated with total CEO compensation that is $1.5 million 
higher (28% above the mean).   
5.2. Comparing blockholder fixed effects distributions and simulated distributions    
Another approach to quantifying the magnitude and economic significance of our results is to 
compare the blockholder fixed effect distributions reported in the first set of columns in Panel A of Table 
6 to simulated distributions produced by the reassignment of all blockholders to random firms.  More 
specifically, we start by reassigning each blockholder in our data set to random firm-year observations 
and then re-estimate the blockholder fixed effects.  We repeat this procedure 100 times, which produces 
the simulated distributions.  The second set of columns in the table reports the 25th and 75th percentiles 
for the resulting simulated distributions.  The final set of columns reports the statistic and p-value of a 22
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for the equality of the actual blockholder fixed effects 
distribution and the simulated distribution for each corporate policy variable.   
The conclusion from this analysis is that the actual blockholder fixed effects distributions are 
significantly different from the simulated ones.  The KS-tests reject the null hypothesis of equality of 
distribution functions, at least at the 10% level for all of the corporate policies but one.  This evidence 
allows us to conclude that the estimated blockholder fixed effects reported in this paper are economically 
large and that the estimated differences between blockholders are substantially bigger than what we 
would expect if blockholdings were simply randomly distributed across firms.   
Panel B of Table 6 repeats this analysis for groups of blockholders.  We have combined the 
different categories into two groups based on their significance in Table 5, and report separate KS tests.  
We can reject the equality of distributions for all corporate policies for the first category, which is 
comprised of activists, pension funds, corporations, individuals, mutual funds, LBO firms, and VC firms.  
Hence, for these blockholders, the estimated differences between blockholders are bigger than what 
would be expected if blockholders were randomly distributed across firms.  By contrast, for most 
corporate policies, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality for the group consisting of hedge 
funds, insurance companies, and money managers.   
5.3. Large shareholders’ investment and governance styles   
The results so far show that there are economically large differences between blockholders.
However, because our empirical framework with blockholder fixed effects takes the analysis of large 
shareholders to the level of the individual blockholder, we are also able to present evidence on systematic 
patterns in blockholders’ behavior.  For instance, are some blockholders more focused on investment and 
firm growth than others?  Are some large shareholders financially more aggressive?  Our objective is to 
present evidence on large shareholders’ investment and governance styles.   
In order to do so, we estimate the following regression model:   23
jp jq j p q DE H    z īī  (4) 
where j indexes blockholders,  jp ī  and  jq ī  are the blockholder fixed effect vectors for two of the 
corporate policy variables of interest, and  j H  is an error term.  The right hand side variable is an 
estimated coefficient, thus potentially resulting in a downward bias of E  when using OLS estimation.  To 
correct for this bias, we therefore employ a weighted least squares (WLS) approach where we weight 
each observation by the inverse of the square root of the standard error on the right hand side blockholder 
fixed effect  jq ī .
Table 7 shows that different large shareholders have distinct styles.  First, studying patterns in 
investment policy, we see that blockholders associated with more capital expenditures are on average also 
associated with significantly more M&A activity, but fewer diversifying acquisitions.  This result 
indicates that different blockholders have different preferences with regard to company growth: some 
have an “aggressive investment style,” while others believe in the status quo or a policy of diversification.  
Another interesting pattern is that firms with blockholders with a more aggressive investment style also 
appear to be more investment to Q sensitive but less investment-to-cash-flow sensitive.   
Second, examining patterns in financial policies, we find that while some large shareholders have 
an “aggressive financial style,” others have adopted a much less aggressive approach to corporate 
financial policies.  For example, blockholders that are linked to higher levels of debt in the capital 
structure of the firms in which they are major owners are also associated with significantly lower levels of 
cash holdings (i.e., less financial slack).   
Finally, we also ask: are blockholders that are linked to higher levels of CEO pay also associated 
with other corporate policies in an economically meaningful way?  As can be seen in the table, we find 
that blockholders that are associated with higher total CEO compensation are also associated with a 
significantly more aggressive attitude to investment, higher investment to Q sensitivity, and fewer 
diversifying acquisitions.   24
5.4. Blockholder fixed effects in firm performance   
The above evidence suggests that systematic patterns in corporate investment, financial policies, 
and CEO compensation are related to the presence of particular large shareholders.  A related question is 
whether such differences translate into significant heterogeneity in firm performance.   
To this end, Table 8 applies our empirical framework for analyzing blockholder heterogeneity, and 
reports í similar to the previous investigation of corporate policies í two panel regressions for each 
performance variable, ROA (EBITDA over lagged total assets) and Tobin’s Q.  In this table, the 
benchmark regressions control for year and firm fixed effects, and lagged logarithm of total assets.  The 
first result to note in Panel A of the table is that the median effects associated with a large shareholder are 
not significantly different from zero.  This finding is broadly consistent with previous studies, which have 
not found much support for an average (outside) blockholder effect on ROA or Q (e.g., McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Mehran (1995)).
22
We see that the model fit improves by up to three percentage points when we add blockholder 
fixed effects to the model specifications for performance, despite having already controlled for important 
observable and unobservable heterogeneity across firms through time-varying controls and firm fixed 
effect.  The F-statistics are large and statistically significant, rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
blockholder fixed effects in ROA and Q.  We also find that a blockholder at the 75th percentile of the 
ROA distribution is associated with 4% higher returns, all else equal, while one at the 25th percentile is 
associated with 3% lower returns.  Given that the average ROA is about 5% in the sample, the magnitude 
of this effect is also large in economic terms.
23  Similarly, we find that the difference between large 
22 Most of the large shareholders in our sample are outside blockholders.  There is also an important literature on 
whether concentrated inside ownership affects firm performance (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Zhou (2001)).   
23 We do not interpret blockholder effects in ROA as evidence that some blockholders want returns to be lower.  
There are other reasons for blockholder heterogeneity in firm performance.  First, some blockholders might extract 
private benefits from their ownership stakes (e.g., Barclay and Holderness (1989)) that our measures do not account 
for.  Second, there can be variation in skills across different large shareholders, even within one blockholder 
category.  This argument is related to the evidence presented by Lerner, Schoar and Wong (2006) that there is 25
shareholders in the bottom and top quartiles of the Q distribution is 0.57, compared to an average Q ratio 
in our sample of 2.1.   
A final result to note in Table 8 is that some blockholder investment and governance styles are 
linked to higher operating performance and Tobin’s Q than others.  As can be seen in Panel B, we find 
that return on assets and Q is higher in firms with large shareholders that have an aggressive investment 
style, i.e., are associated with more investment and M&A activity.  Firm performance is also higher in 
companies with blockholders associated with higher investment to Q sensitivity.  Interestingly, we also 
see that ROA is higher in firms with blockholders with a preference for more debt in the capital structure 
and higher dividend policy, all else equal.  We further report evidence that return on assets and Q are 
higher in companies with blockholders associated with higher CEO pay and more pay-for-performance 
sensitivity.  The evidence in Table 8 is important in that it shows that the differences in investment and 
governance styles across large shareholders are in turn linked to actual differences in firm performance.   
6. Origin and sources of blockholder heterogeneity   
The previous sections document statistically significant and economically important blockholder 
effects in corporate policies and performance of large U.S. firms.  This evidence suggests that 
heterogeneity is important, but does not inform us about where such variation across blockholders 
actually comes from.  We now attempt to provide evidence on the origin and sources of the blockholder 
fixed effects.  In Section 6.1, we shed some light on the question of causality.  In Section 6.2, we explore 
some characteristics of blockholders that might produce blockholder effects of a larger magnitude.  
6.1. Evidence on influence versus selection   
We have so far been very careful not to give any causal interpretations of the blockholder fixed 
effects.  However, we now turn to the question of causality.  Under the influence interpretation, firm 
significant variation in internal rates of return (IRRs) across private equity LPs and it is consistent with their 
arguments for a skill- or sophistication-based explanation related to the general partners of those firms.   26
policy changes take place after the investment by a blockholder.  By contrast, under the selection 
hypothesis, firm policy changes start to take place, and then blockholders invest in response to these 
policy changes.  Our identification strategy is therefore to use these predictions regarding timing of policy 
changes to provide evidence on whether blockholder fixed effects in firm policies are more consistent 
with active influence or selection.
24
We randomly allocate each blockholder’s ownership stakes into two subsets.  Using the first 
subset of firms, we then estimate blockholder effects as if each blockholder had a stake in the firm one to 
two years (depending on data availability) prior to its actual investment.  That is, if blockholder j invested 
in firm i in year t, then we estimate this blockholder’s “pre-investment fixed effect” as if the blockholder 
had invested in the firm in year t-2 and sold its stake in year t.  Using the second subset we estimate the 
blockholder fixed effects using equation (1).  Next, we examine whether the pre-investment fixed effects 
and the actual blockholder effects are significantly correlated.  Under the influence interpretation, we 
would expect zero or negative correlation between firms’ policy choices just prior to and after a 
blockholder’s investment.  Under the selection interpretation, we expect the effects to have a positive 
correlation because firms’ policy choices just prior to and after a blockholder’s investment are similar.   
Table 9 presents our results.  The first set of columns reports results for all large shareholders.  
We see that the evidence on influence versus selection is inconclusive as some of the coefficients are 
positive while others are negative.  In the next set of columns, we therefore report separate results for 
different categories of large shareholders.  For activist, pension fund, corporate, individual, LBO and VC 
blockholders, many of the estimated coefficients are negative and significant.  This finding is more 
consistent with an influence interpretation.  Firms’ policy choices just prior to and after the investment of 
one of these large shareholders are significantly different.  That is, policy changes seem to take place after 
these categories of large shareholder’s invest in a firm.  By contrast, several of the estimated coefficients 
are positive and significant for mutual funds.  This result is more consistent with a selection explanation.  
24 We also note that causation can be possible even in cases with significant barriers to intervention in firms’ policy 
choices.  Edmans (2007), for example, presents a model in which the arrival of a blockholder allows a manager to 
pursue projects that he would have otherwise avoided.   27
Firms’ policy choices just prior to and after the investment of a mutual fund blockholder are similar.  That 
is, firm policy changes start to take place, and mutual funds invest in response to these policy changes.   
We do not want to interpret the above evidence too aggressively because of the short time period 
available for analysis.  However, the results suggest two novel findings regarding large shareholders and 
corporate policies in the U.S.  First, one of the potential explanations for blockholder fixed effects í
influence or selection í does not fit all large shareholders: blockholder heterogeneity is important and 
some types of large shareholders appear to influence the policy choices of the firms in which they have 
blocks, while others systematically select firms based on the observable corporate policies which they 
believe maximize value.  Second, our result of systematic selection by some large shareholders adds to 
existing evidence that institutional investors have a preference for certain stock characteristics, and 
suggests that the list of characteristics include not only firm size, share price, or liquidity as has 
previously been suggested by Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett, Sias and Starks (2003), but also 
corporate policies.
6.2. Evidence on the sources of blockholder fixed effects
Next, we want to go a step further with an analysis that explores the source of blockholder fixed 
effects in corporate policies and firm performance.  Do blockholders that have larger effects on average 
hold larger ownership stakes?  Are they members of the board?  And are they involved as officers in the 
daily management and operations of the firms in which they are major owners?  We now analyze the role 
of these three observable blockholder characteristics to help us understand the sources of the differences 
in behavior and impact across large shareholders.   
We relate the magnitudes of the 361 estimated blockholder fixed effects from Section 4 to 
observable blockholder characteristics that capture a blockholders’ power to monitor and influence 
important corporate policies.  To perform this analysis, we have compiled data on three blockholder 
characteristics: block size, board representation, and management involvement as an officer.  Because a 
blockholder has by construction multiple holdings in our dataset, we have averaged the characteristics 28
across a blockholder’s stakes.  Panel A of Table 10 reports summary statistics of the characteristics.  The 
average holding of each blockholder is 9.6% in our data set, while 10.9% of the blockholders have board 
representation, and 2.2% are officers, most often CEOs. 
We predict that blockholders with, on average, larger blocks, representation on the board, or daily 
management involvement have more power.  In our empirical framework, more blockholder power 
translates into larger blockholder fixed effects.
Panel B of Table 10 reports that the magnitude of the blockholder fixed effect, as measured by the 
absolute value of the effect, is positively associated with block size, board membership, and day-to-day 
operational involvement.  First, blockholders with larger blocks have larger fixed effects for most of the 
corporate policy and firm performance metrics.  To see that the economic magnitude of these effects is 
large, we can compare two blockholders: one with an average block size and one with a 6.5% (= one 
standard deviation) larger-than-average block size. According to our estimates, the blockholder with the 
larger average stake is associated with a 23% larger investment fixed effect.  Considering capital structure 
policy, we find that the blockholder with the larger stake has a 24% larger leverage fixed effect.  Turning 
to executive compensation, the blockholder with the larger stake is associated with a 20% larger 
blockholder effect related to total executive compensation.  We also find that the blockholder with the 
larger average stake is associated with a 25% larger performance fixed effect, compared to the average 
blockholder in our sample.   
  We find that large shareholders with board representation have significantly larger blockholder 
effects, suggesting that a directorship provides a blockholder with more power to monitor and influence.  
Interestingly, we find particularly strong effects for corporate policies where the board is expected to play 
an important role.  For example, a blockholder with board memberships has dividend policy effects more 
than double those of a blockholder without board representation.  In regards to executive compensation, a 
blockholder on the board is associated with 1.5 times larger effects related to total CEO compensation.   
  Finally, although a smaller number of coefficients are significant compared to the other two 
blockholder characteristics, there is some evidence that blockholders that are officers have larger policy 29
effects, at least for acquisition and diversification policy, executive compensation policy, and return on 
assets.  Not surprisingly, a blockholder with day-to-day operational involvement is associated with much 
bigger effects than a blockholder that is not an officer.   
  In summary, the above analysis provides evidence on the source of the previously documented 
blockholder heterogeneity.  Measures of blockholder power, such as block size, board membership, and 
daily management involvement are positively related to the magnitude of the blockholder fixed effects.  
These results suggests that the blockholder fixed effects we identify in this paper can, at least in part, be 
attributable to observable blockholder characteristics proxying for a blockholder’s power and potential to 
impact corporate policies and firm performance.
25
7. Conclusion
We develop an empirical framework that allows us to analyze the effects of heterogeneity across 
large shareholders, using a new blockholder-firm panel data set in which we can track all unique 
blockholders among large U.S. public firms.  We find statistically significant and economically important 
blockholder fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies.  This evidence 
suggests that blockholders vary in their beliefs, skills, or preferences.  The blockholder effects are found 
to be concentrated in categories such as activists, pension funds, corporations, individuals, private equity 
firms, and mutual funds.   
Our analysis also shows that different large shareholders have distinct investment and governance 
styles.  We find systematic patterns across large shareholders when it comes to their approaches to 
corporate investment and growth, their appetites for financial leverage, and their attitudes towards CEO 
pay.  We find that blockholder fixed effects are also present in firm performance measures, and that 
25 While this analysis provides some evidence on the sources of blockholder fixed effects, our particular data set 
limits the depth and scope of the analysis.  For example, the three blockholder characteristics we study in this paper 
are only a subset of the characteristics that might be related to the behavior and impact of large shareholders.  For 
example, one would want to have detailed data on the top management at the large shareholders’ organizations, past 
investment experiences and returns, and possibly also their social networks.  However, data limitations restrict the 
analysis we are able to perform.   30
differences in style are systematically related to firm performance differences.  Moreover, we show that 
our results are more consistent with influence for activist, pension fund, corporate, individual and private 
equity blockholders, but more consistent with systematic selection for large mutual fund shareholders.  
Finally, we analyze some sources of the heterogeneity, and find that blockholders with more potential 
power and influence, as measured by block size, board representation, and management involvement as 
officers are associated with larger effects on corporate policies and firm performance.   
The evidence of blockholder heterogeneity has implications for interpretations of existing 
evidence on large shareholders and corporate policies.  Evidence of a small and insignificant average 
blockholder effect does not mean that large shareholders play no role in shaping corporate policies 
because important information regarding a blockholder’s impact on firms is lost when effects of different 
blockholders are aggregated in a large cross-sectional sample.  Our evidence on blockholder 
heterogeneity also introduces a number of questions for future research.  For example, in this paper we 
study heterogeneity across blockholders among large U.S. firms, but how do our findings compare to 
those from samples of smaller firms, where the scope for influence might be greater, or countries and 
institutional environments with different corporate governance systems?   31
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Appendix I: Filing requirements for large shareholders 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, rules 13d-1 to 13d-6 (§240.13d) contain the filing requirements for 
large shareholders. Any individual or group that has acquired a beneficial stake of 5% or more in a class 
of equity is required to file the form SC 13D. However, it is important to know that not all large 
shareholders file a form SC 13-D. A select category of “persons” such as banks, brokers and dealers, and 
insurance companies can file an abbreviated form, the SC 13G, that does not require such detailed 
disclosure. Item 4 of form SC 13-D requires the filer to disclose his intentions with respect to the 
company. Item 4 is quite specific and lists 10 different actions of a large shareholder that would require 
disclosure:
(a)  The acquisition by any person of additional securities of the issuer, or the 
disposition of securities of the issuer;  
(b) An extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or 
liquidation, involving the issuer or any of its subsidiaries;  
(c)  A sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of the issuer or any of its 
subsidiaries;
(d) Any change in the present board of directors or management of the issuer, 
including any plans or proposals to change the number or term of directors or to 
fill any existing vacancies on the board;  
 (e) Any material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy of the 
issuer;
(f)  Any other material change in the issuer's business or corporate structure 
including but not limited to, if the issuer is a registered closed-end investment 
company, any plans or proposals to make any changes in its investment policy 
for which a vote is required by section 13 of the Investment Company Act of 
1940;  
(g) Changes in the issuer's charter, bylaws or instruments corresponding thereto or 
other actions which may impede the acquisition of control of the issuer by any 
person;
(h) Causing a class of securities of the issuer to be delisted from a national 
securities exchange or to cease to be authorized to be quoted in an inter-dealer 
quotation system of a registered national securities association;  
(i)  A class of equity securities of the issuer becoming eligible for termination of 
registration pursuant to Section 12(g)(4) of the Act; or 
  (j)  Any action similar to any of those enumerated above.  35
Appendix II: Variable definitions
The corporate variables used in this paper are defined as follows:  
Investment policies
x Investment is capital expenditures (Compustat item 128) over lagged net property, plant, and 
equipment (Compustat item 8).  
x Number of acquisitions is the total number of acquisitions in the fiscal year.  
x Number of diversifying acquisitions is the number of acquisitions per fiscal year in industries 
other than the one of the acquirer.  Industry affiliation is measured by the Fama-French 48 
industry classification.  
x R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures (Compustat item 46) over lagged total assets (Compustat 
item 6).  
Financial policies
x Leverage is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) plus current liabilities (Compustat item 34) 
divided by long-term debt plus current liabilities plus book value of common equity (Compustat 
item 60).  
x Dividends/earnings is the ratio of the sum of common dividends (Compustat item 21) and 
preferred dividends (Compustat item 19) over earnings before depreciation, interest, and tax 
(Compustat item 13). 
x Cash holdings is defined as cash and short-term investments (Compustat item 1) over lagged net 
property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item 8).  
Executive compensation 
x Total compensation is the sum of cash salary, cash bonus, and the Black-Scholes value of options 
granted during a fiscal year to the CEO (Execucomp item TDC1).  
x Salary is defined as the cash salary to the CEO for a fiscal year (Execucomp item salary).  
x Total incentive compensation is the logarithm of total dollar equity incentives. Total dollar equity 
incentives are measured as the dollar amount an executive has at stake from his entire portfolio of 
stocks and options for a 1% change in firm value. It is constructed from Execucomp data using 
the algorithm of Core and Guay (2002). 
Firm performance 
x Return on assets is the ratio of EBITDA (Compustat item 18) over lagged total assets (Compustat 
item 6).  
x Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (Compustat 
item 6). The market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of 36
common equity (calendar year close (Compustat item 25) times shares outstanding (Compustat 
item 199)) less the sum of the book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) and balance 
sheet deferred taxes (Compustat item 74).  
Control variables  
x Cash flow is defined as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat item 18) and 
depreciation (Compustat item 14) divided by lagged net property, plant, and equipment 
(Compustat item 8).   


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summary statistics: Corporate variables  
The table reports descriptive statistics for the corporate variables analyzed.  The “Blockholder-firm 
sample” is the sample used in this paper.  See section 3 for further details on the specifics of the 
construction of the data set.  The “Compustat sample” is a comparison sample of all firms covered by 
the Compustat-CRSP merged database during our sample time period 1996-2002.  Both samples 
exclude financial firms and utilities.  All variable definitions are reported in Appendix II.  “N” refers 
to the maximum number of firm-year observations; not all corporate variables are available for each 
firm-year.   
  Blockholder-firm sample  Compustat sample 
Mean Median  St. dev.  Mean  Median St.  dev. 
Investment policies         
Investment    0.28 0.22 0.23  0.41 0.25 0.48 
Number of acquisitions   0.59  0  1.1  N/A   N/A  N/A 
Number of diversifying acquisitions  0.30  0  0.71  N/A  N/A  N/A 
R&D  0.03 0 0.06  0.05 0 0.10 
Financial policies          
Leverage    0.37 0.37 0.28  0.36 0.32 0.31 
Dividends/earnings    0.19 0.05 0.55  0.15  0  0.38 
Cash  holdings    1.23 0.17 3.39  3.54 0.25 0.58 
Executive compensation           
Total compensation   5,374  2,716  7,724  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Salary    601 556 300  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Total incentive compensation   1,241  238  6,233  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Firm performance         
Return on assets   0.05  0.06  0.11  -0.05  0.02  0.24 
Tobin’s  Q    2.1 1.5 1.6  2.1 1.3 1.9 
Control variables         
Cash  flow    0.52 0.35 0.94  -0.35 0.27 3.63 
Total  assets    4,624 1,218  10,317  2,007 194.9 5,703 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Blockholder fixed effects and corporate policies 
The sample is the blockholder-firm panel data set described in section 3.  All variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix II.  The table reports two regressions for each corporate policy variable.  The first 
row reports the adjusted R
2 and the number of firm-years for a benchmark model specification which 
includes year and firm fixed effects and time-varying firm-level characteristics.  The second row also 
adds blockholder fixed effects, and reports the number of blockholders, the median estimated blockholder 
fixed effect, and an F-test for the joint significance of the blockholder fixed effects.  For the “Investment 
to cash flow” and “Investment to Q” regressions, the F-tests are for the joint significance of the 
interaction between the blockholder fixed effects and cash flow and Q, respectively.  In the “Investment” 
regressions, the time-varying firm-level controls included are lagged Q, lagged cash flow, and the lagged 
logarithm of total assets.  In the “Investment to cash flow” and “Investment to Q” regressions, we also 
include interactions of the firm and blockholder fixed effects with cash flows and lagged Q, respectively.  
The “Number of acquisitions” regressions include lagged logarithm of total assets and return on assets.  
The “Number of diversifying acquisitions” and “R&D” regressions include lagged cash flow, lagged 
logarithm of total assets, and return on assets.  In the “N of diversifying acquisitions” regressions we also 
include a dummy variable for whether the firm undertook any acquisition in that particular firm-year.  In 
the financial policy regressions, the time-varying firm-level controls included are lagged cash flow, 
lagged logarithm of total assets, and return on assets.  In the executive compensation regressions, the 
time-varying firm-level controls included are lagged Q and the lagged logarithm of total assets.  ***, **, 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
Panel A: Investment policies   
Dependent variable   N of blockholders Median  Adj. R
2  F-test   N of firm-years 
Investment     0.59    5,555 
Investment 356  0.00  0.61  1.69***  5,555 
Investment to CF sensitivity      0.65    5,553 
Investment to CF sensitivity  356 0.00  0.72  2.59***  5,553 
Investment to Q sensitivity      0.66    5,553 
Investment to Q sensitivity  356 0.04  0.70  1.56***  5,553 
N of acquisitions      0.24 5,753 
N of acquisitions  361  0.01  0.24  0.80  5,753 
N of diversifying acquisitions      0.45    5,753 
N of diversifying acquisitions  361  -0.01  0.45  0.66  5,753 
R&D     0.84    5,753 
R&D 361  0.00  0.86  3.57***  5,753 
Panel B: Financial policies
Dependent variable   N of blockholders Median  Adj. R
2  F-test   N of firm-years 
Leverage     0.81    5,653 
Leverage 359  0.00  0.82  2.11***    5,653 
Dividend/earnings       0.66    5,672 
Dividend/earnings 358  0.01  0.67  1.30***  5,672 
Cash holdings       0.85    5,632 
Cash holdings  357  0.04  0.87  2.33***  5,632 42
Table 4 - cont’d
Panel C: Executive compensation   
Dependent variable   N of blockholders Median  Adj. R
2  F-test   N of firm-years 
Total compensation       0.60 4,999 
Total compensation  338 -0.01  0.69  1.44***  4,999 
Salary       0.62    5,016 
Salary 338  0.03  0.69  2.47***  5,016 
Total incentive compensation      0.77 4,849 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B:  Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests for different categories of large shareholders 
Activists, pension funds, 
corporations,  individuals, mutual 
funds, LBO firms, VC firms  
Hedge funds, insurance 
companies, money managers 
N 206  129 
































































Large shareholders’ investment and governance styles   
The sample is the blockholder-firm panel data set described in section 3.  All variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix II.  Each number in this table corresponds to a separate regression.  Each number 
reports the coefficient from a regression of the blockholder fixed effects from the row variable on the 
blockholder fixed effects from the column variable.  Observations in the regressions are weighted by the 
inverse of the standard error of the explanatory variable to account for estimation error.  ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
 Investment Leverage Total  comp.   
  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Investment         1.57***  0.20 
Leverage   -0.13*  0.07      -0.85**  0.35 
Inv. to CF sensitivity   -0.02***  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.12***  0.02 
Inv. to Q sensitivity   0.02***  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.04***  0.01 
Cash holdings   0.05***  0.01  -0.02***   0.01  0.14***  0.02 
Dividend/earnings  0.15 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.62 0.44 
N of acquisitions  0.19***  0.03  -0.06***   0.02   0.53***  0.10 
N of diversifying acq.  -0.31***  0.04  -0.05  0.03  -0.79***  0.19  47
Table 8 
Blockholder fixed effects and firm performance  
The sample is the blockholder-firm panel data set described in section 3.  All variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix II.  Panel A reports two regressions for each corporate policy variable.  The first 
row reports the adjusted R
2 and the number of firm-years for a benchmark model specification which 
includes year and firm fixed effects and time-varying firm-level characteristics.  The second row also 
adds blockholder fixed effects, and reports the number of blockholders, the median estimated blockholder 
fixed effect, the 25th and 75th percentiles of each blockholder fixed effects distribution, and an F-test for 
the joint significance of the blockholder fixed effects.  In each regression, we also control for the lagged 
logarithm of total assets.  Each fixed effect is weighted by the inverse of its standard error to account for 
estimation error.  Panel B reports the coefficient from a regression of the blockholder fixed effects in 
performance on each of the row variables.  Each number in this table corresponds to a separate regression.  
Observations in the regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the explanatory 
variable to account for estimation error.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels.








2 F-test   
N of firm-
years 
Return on assets           0.57    5,711 
Return on assets  359  0.01  -0.03 0.04 0.60 1.75***   5,711 
Tobin’s Q          0.74 5,695 
Tobin’s Q   359 0.03  -0.23  0.34  0.75  1.27***  5,695 
Panel B: Firm performance and large shareholders’ investment and governance styles      
  Return on assets  Tobin’s Q 
  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Investment policies      
Investment   0.16***   0.02  2.02***   0.24 
Investment to CF sensitivity   -0.03***   0.00  -0.02***   0.00 
Investment to Q sensitivity   0.02**   0.01  0.02***   0.00 
N of acquisitions  0.07***   0.01  0.54***   0.13 
N of diversifying acquisitions  -0.05**   0.02  -0.90***   0.23 
R&D  -0.35***   0.05  9.97***   1.35 
Financial policies      
Leverage   0.05*   0.03  0.18   0.36 
Dividend/earnings    0.22***   0.04  1.62***   0.48 
Cash holdings   0.01***   0.00  0.07**   0.03 
Executive compensation       
Total compensation  0.05***   0.00  0.30***   0.07 
Salary   0.02***  0.00  0.30***  0.03 
Total incentive compensation  0.01*  0.00  0.13*  0.07 48
Table 9
Evidence on influence versus selection   
The sample is the blockholder-firm panel data set described in section 3.  All variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix II.  Each number in this table corresponds to a separate regression.  Reported in the 
table are estimates from regressing “pre-entry blockholder fixed effects” (from a period prior to the 
blockholder’s investment) on the actual blockholder fixed effects.  Observations in the regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the explanatory variable to account for estimation error.  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
 All   
Activists, pension funds, 
corporations,  individuals, 
LBO-firms, VC-funds    Mutual funds  
 Coef.    S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Investment policies           
Investment  -0.05 0.04 -0.14**  0.06  -0.03 0.19 
N of acquisitions  0.16**  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.21*  0.12 
N of diversifying acquisitions  0.18*  0.10  0.06  0.06  0.21***  0.08 
R&D -0.04  0.05  -0.19*  0.10  0.20  0.14 
Financial policies           
Leverage 0.00  0.07  -0.37***  0.12  -0.03  0.12 
Dividends/earnings -0.03  0.05  -0.10*  0.05  0.10  0.36 
Cash holdings   -0.07**  0.03  -0.20***  0.07  -0.06   0.06 
Executive compensation           
Total  compensation  -0.08 0.05 -0.15*  0.09  -0.09 0.12 
Salary   -0.05  0.05  0.07  0.10  0.15**  0.08 
Total incentive compensation  -0.10*  0.06  -0.15**  0.06  0.02  0.02 
Firm performance            
Return on assets   0.03  0.05  0.11  0.10  0.25***  0.09 
Tobin’s Q   -0.10*** 0.03  -0.25***  0.10  -0.08  0.11 49
Table 10
Where do blockholder effects come from?    
The sample is the blockholder-firm panel data set described in section 3.  All variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix II.  Panel A reports summary statistics for blockholder characteristics.  “Block size” 
is the fraction of shares held by a blockholder.  “Board member” is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if a blockholder is a board member, and zero otherwise.  “Officer” is a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if the blockholder is an officer of the corporation, and zero otherwise.  A blockholder’s overall 
characteristic is based on an average across a blockholder’s holdings.  Panel B reports estimates from 
regressing the absolute value of blockholder fixed effects on these three blockholder characteristics.  Each 
row corresponds to a separate regression.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels.   
Panel A: Summary statistics: Characteristics of blockholders  
 N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Median  St.  dev. 
Block size   361  0.051  0.624 0.096 0.078 0.065 
Board membership   361   0  1  0.109  0  0.257 
Officer   361   0  1  0.022  0  0.119 
Panel B: Blockholder fixed effects and blockholder characteristics   
  Block size   Board member    Officer   
  Coef.   S.E.  Coef.   S.E.  Coef.   S.E. 
Investment policies       
Investment 0.345***  0.104  -0.044 0.032 0.067 0.062 
N of acquisitions  0.186  0.207  0.264***  0.062 0.242* 0.124 
N of diversifying acq.  0.302**  0.128  0.123***  0.039 0.150* 0.077 
R&D 0.068***  0.020  0.013**  0.006 0.007 0.012 
Financial policies        
Leverage 0.249***  0.075  0.051**  0.022 0.048 0.044 
Dividends/earnings 0.287***  0.057  0.038**  0.017 0.036 0.034 
Cash holdings   0.470  1.070  0.184 0.325 0.047 0.639 
Executive compensation        
Total compensation  1.140**  0.443  0.253** 0.118  1.093***  0.248 
Salary    5.61*** 0.984 0.591** 0.262  2.904***  0.550 
Total incentive comp.  0.434  0.527  0.374***  0.141 0.187 0.295 
Firm performance         
Return on assets   0.148***  0.040  0.015  0.012  0.071***  0.024 
Tobin’s Q   2.380***  0.526 0.096 0.156 0.457 0.312  SIFR Research Report Series
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